This report is based on aggregated information collected by the PEN Belarus monitoring group during the first three months of 2025 from open sources, personal contacts, and direct communication with cultural figures. If you wish to report violations (including confidentially) or correct inaccuracies, please contact us at [email protected], t.me/viadoma. The more accurately we can record and analyse the human rights situation in the cultural sphere, the more effectively we can plan our work to support cultural figures and cultural projects.
More about the monitoring is available here.
NB: To protect users’ information security, we do not provide direct links to information sources if restrictions have been imposed on them per the regulations currently in force in the Republic of Belarus.
Main results
Persecution of imprisoned cultural figures
Violation of civil-political and socio-economic rights of cultural figures
Persecution of exiled cultural figures
Censorship and violation of cultural rights
Culture-related materials labelled as “extremist”
State policy in the field of culture*
Conclusion
*Based on an analysis of publications on the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Belarus Telegram channel in January 2025.
MAIN RESULTS
In the first quarter of 2025, repression and politically motivated persecution of cultural figures continued in the form of arbitrary arrests and detentions; administrative and criminal trials; pressure in places of incarceration; summons to police stations, the KGB, or employers for crime-prevention interviews; home visits by police officers; a de facto ban on profession and exhibitions, and limitations on the presentation of creative work.
- 319 violations of cultural rights and human rights of cultural figures were recorded.
- As of 31 March 2025, there were 1208 political prisoners [1], including at least [2] 97 cultural figures in Belarus.
- At least 165 cultural figures were behind bars serving politically motivated sentences in penal colonies, prisons, detention centres, open-type correctional institutions, or with restricted freedom in home confinement.
- For the first time since PEN Belarus had started monitoring, labelling culture-related content or cultural figures’ social media accounts as extremist materials was the most frequent type of violation recorded in a given period (115 cases), followed by censorship (49) and violations of the right to a fair trial involving cultural figures or organisations in the cultural sphere (36 cases).
- At least 12 cultural figures were criminally prosecuted. For almost half of them, this was their second or third conviction since the events of 2020.
- Censorship affected, among other things, at least two events related to traditional Belarusian culture – a field regarded since 2020 as allowed and relatively safe for creative expression.
- It can be said that the authorities may have halted or concluded a campaign to liquidate civil society organisations. In the first quarter of 2025, only four CSOs, including one organisation in the cultural sector, were forcibly dissolved.
- In January 2025, the state cultural policy focused on the re-election [3] of Alaksandr Łukašenka to a seventh presidential term. 31.2 % of the content on the official Telegram channel of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Belarus was dedicated to this theme – ranging from calls for early voting and quotations from Łukašenka’s speeches to coverage of the “cultural dimension of the electoral process”.
PERSECUTION OF IMPRISONED CULTURAL FIGURES
The conditions of incarceration for politically imprisoned cultural figures remain a serious concern, particularly due to the use of incommunicado and prison term extensions.
⇒ Lawyer, writer, and bard Maksim Znak has been completely isolated from the outside world for over two years. Since 9 February 2023, his relatives have had no contact with him. The same applies to political activist, video blogger, and cultural manager Siarhiej Cichanoŭski, who has been isolated since 9 March 2023. Human rights defenders treat these cases as enforced disappearances.
Anarchist and prison literature author Alaksandr Franckievič has been held incommunicado for almost six months (in July 2024, his mother was detained, in February 2025, she was sentenced to three years and three months in prison for alleged participation in an “extremist formation”).
⇒ Authorities continue the practice of artificially extending prison terms for political prisoners by opening new criminal cases against them. This method aims, in part, to prevent their release after the original sentence ends. For example, anarchist and prison prose writer Mikałaj Dziadok was due for release on 25 April 2025 after a five-year sentence. However, he did not walk out free as scheduled. First, a new case was opened under charges in Article 411 of the Criminal Code (malicious disobedience to prison administration). In March, a second new criminal case was reported.
Cultural manager Eduard Babaryka, and anarchist and prison prose author Alaksandr Franckievič, imprisoned for political motives, were also prosecuted under Article 411 – for the second time within a year. Their most recent trials took place in February 2025.
In January, librarian Julija Łaptanovič, who had already received a four-year and nine-month sentence, was tried in a new criminal case under Article 361-4 (facilitating extremist activity).
In February 2025, musician and screenwriter Kirył Vieviel – already sentenced to three years in a penal colony six months earlier – was tried again, now under Articles 361-1 (participation in an extremist formation) and 130 (incitement to hatred). He was also listed as a person involved in terrorist activity.
Also in February, Michaił Łabań, owner of the jewellery workshop Samarodak, was convicted again – this time under Article 361-2 (financing extremist activities). His sentence was extended by six months, adding to the previously imposed four years in a penal colony.
⇒ There is continued pressure on political prisoners to appear in discrediting video materials broadcast on state television. These “interviews” may often herald their release. In mid-January 2025, state propaganda channels aired a video featuring Radio Svaboda employees – an author on Belarusian cultural and historical heritage, Ihar Karniej, and poet, translator, and journalist Andrej Kuzniečyk. One month later, on 12 February, Andrej Kuzniečyk and two other political prisoners were released by pardon, made possible through mediation by the U.S. Department of State.
⇒ In January 2025, activist and publicist Alena Hnaŭk was punished with six months in a cell-type room for alleged gross violations of prison rules. Journalist and essayist Andrej Pačobut (Andrzej Poczobut) also had his cell-type room confinement extended by another six months.
⇒ Political prisoners continue to face physical and psychological pressure from prison administrations. Standard methods include solitary confinement or punishment cells, bans on visits and packages from relatives, and coercion to write clemency appeals addressed to Łukašenka.
There were also cases where prison administrations confiscated manuscripts written by imprisoned cultural figures without guaranteeing they would be returned rather than destroyed.
⇒ Conditions for politically motivated administrative detainees are deliberately degrading. In cells, lights remain on 24/7, metal bunks lack mattresses, and sitting or lying down is forbidden except at night (from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.). Night roll calls are made every two hours, and each morning begins with a search: detainees are handcuffed and taken into the hallway while the cell is searched. No access to books, periodicals, or other reading material is allowed during administrative arrest.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL-POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF CULTURAL FIGURES
Arbitrary detentions and arrests continue, along with politically motivated administrative and criminal persecution of cultural figures, intimidation, summons for “crime-prevention interviews”, inspections at border crossings, phone searches, de facto bans on profession, and other forms of pressure from the authorities.
⇒ Cultural figures continue to be arrested for participating in the peaceful protests of 2020 (Article 342 of the Criminal Code), for making critical statements about socially significant events (Article 130 of the Criminal Code), for critical comments on social media directed at Alaksandr Łukašenka and other officials Articles 367, 368, and 369 of the Criminal Code), and for cooperating with or supporting independent media and civil society initiatives (Articles 361-1, 361-2, 361-4 of the Criminal Code), and others.
Increasingly, information about detentions and arrests reaches human rights defenders months later, or sometimes much later than that.
⇒ At least 12 cultural figures faced criminal prosecution. Nearly half of the sentences (42 %) were handed down to individuals who had already been serving time. As of this writing, only 5 out of 12 trials have known outcomes.
⇒ The practice of holding closed-door political trials For example, the prosecution of Japanese citizen Nakanishi Masatoshi on espionage charges under Article 358-1 of the Criminal Code took place behind closed doors over two months. On 17 March 2025, a court sentenced the Japanese language teacher to seven years in a penal colony.
⇒ Cultural figures were most frequently subjected to administrative punishment under Article 19.11 of the Code of Administrative Offences – for distributing allegedly extremist materials. This article was cited in 9 out of 14 documented cases during the reporting period. Other applied provisions included: Article 24.23 (picketing on social media); Article 19.10 (propaganda of Nazi symbols). One known case is against a cultural figure under Article 10.9 of the Code of Administrative Offences (violation of electoral laws). Court rulings are known in only 2 out of 14 administrative cases.
⇒ Extrajudicial persecution – now a routine form of rights violation – included:
- summons for “crime-prevention conversations” at local police stations or with “security specialists” at places of employment;
- coercion to sign pledges not to engage in “extremist activity”;
- border interrogations with questions about the purpose of travel and checks of mobile phones for subscriptions, private messages, and browser history;
- dismissals and the inability to obtain official employment in state institutions;
- pressure on relatives;
- other forms of both covert and overt persecution.
PERSECUTION OF EXILED CULTURAL FIGURES
Transnational persecution of cultural figures – political émigrés – continues through the initiation of new criminal cases in Belarus, trials in absentia, property seizures, public defamation, inclusion in the lists of “extremists” and “terrorists”, designation of initiatives as “extremist formations”, and pressure on relatives inside Belarus.
⇒ The practice of pre-emptive intimidation and subsequent identification of participants in protest rallies and cultural actions abroad continues.
On 27 January, the Investigative Committee reported the identification and criminal prosecution of 365 participants and organisers of events held abroad on 26 January, the day of the so-called presidential election in Belarus. This number later grew to “about 400” suspects. On 21 March, the Committee threatened to prosecute the potential participants of the upcoming Freedom Day celebrations. Later, propaganda media claimed that security services had identified 260 people participating in the 25 March rallies.
We will continue to monitor the situation and identify cultural figures that this persecution may affect.
⇒ Trials in absentia were held in which previously convicted cultural figures had their sentences replaced with harsher ones – for example, restricted freedom in an open-type facility or home confinement (forms of non-custodial punishment) replaced with a term in a penal colony. During the reporting period, such trials occurred, at least in the cases of poet, musician, translator Mikita Najdzionaŭ, and former editor-in-chief of the Novy Čas newspaper, Aksana Kołb.
⇒ The practice of property seizure On 18 January, journalist and filmmaker Maryja Bułavinskaja from Homiel learned that her rural home had been confiscated as per a resolution by the Investigative Committee. Then, on 29 January, her documentary film Forest, released in the summer of 2024, focusing on Stalin-era repressions and exposing the wrongdoings of the Homiel authorities, was designated as “extremist material”.
⇒ New cultural figures in political exile are declared wanted in Belarus, an indication that authorities opened criminal cases against them.
In January, it was reported that musician Siarhiej Michałok, photographers Julija Lejdzik and Jaŭhien Kanaploŭ, and the head of a civil initiative to commemorate the victims of Stalin-era repressions “Khaisy”, Jan Dziaržaŭcaŭ, and other representatives of the cultural sphere were placed on wanted lists.
⇒ A second criminal case – now under Article 342 of the Criminal Code – was opened against Arciom Ziańkoŭ, owner of a photo and video equipment rental company. In November 2024, he was sentenced to three years in home confinement under Article 361-2 of the Criminal Code (financing activities of an extremist formation). He fled Belarus shortly afterwards.
⇒ The pattern of adding cultural figures to the lists of “extremists” and “terrorists” continues, also after in-absentia convictions. In January 2025, stand-up comedian Słava Kamisaranka, known for his parodies of Alaksandr Łukašenka, was added to both lists after a December 2024 court ruling sentenced him in absentia to six years in a penal colony.
⇒ The practice of designating cultural initiatives in exile as “extremist formations” also persists. This leads to criminal prosecution of participants, makes these initiatives unsafe for people inside Belarus, and effectively cuts off opportunities for collaboration. On 27 January 2025, the KGB added the crowdfunding platform Gronka – launched in July 2024 to support Belarusian cultural and educational projects – to the list of extremist formations. Gronka supported the following initiatives:
- publication of a collection of Belarusian lullabies by the initiative “EthnoTradition”,
- an audiobook titled Zekameron based on the book by Maksim Znak, a political prisoner, lawyer, and writer,
- guide to Belarusian places in Georgia,
- and other projects essential for preserving Belarusian culture and identity.
CENSORSHIP AND VIOLATION OF CULTURAL RIGHTS
The stages and exhibition spaces remain closed to “unreliable” cultural figures, although there have been isolated cases where permission for performances and exhibitions was granted to those previously denied. Such authors are banned from mentions in state-run periodicals. There are also recorded cases of revoked concert permits and exhibitions closing ahead of schedule. The list of printed publications allegedly “posing a threat to the national security of the Republic of Belarus” has been expanded. Discrimination based on the use of the Belarusian language continues. Censorship has affected even the field of traditional culture. Among the taboo topics are the war in Ukraine, the Kalinoŭski Uprising, and the figure of Kastuś Kalinoŭski himself.
⇒ On 24 January 2025, the Ministry of Information published an updated list of printed materials “posing a threat to the national interests of the Republic of Belarus”. The latest update included 30 new titles, all released by Russian publishers such as AST, Eksmo, Popcorn Books, Inspiria, and others. These publications, mainly aimed at an 18+ audience (some 16+), cover a wide range of genres and themes: comics, contemporary novels and romantic fiction for young adults, autobiographical prose, crime, social psychology, sexuality, addictions, homosexual relationships, psychological trauma, identity search, etc. Among those listed were Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Lullaby (a surreal thriller with mysticism and social satire), Anne Applebaum’s Gulag (the 2004 Pulitzer Prize winner based on archival materials), and Hanya Yanagihara’s bestseller A Little Life, dealing with trauma and the psychological effects of abuse.
⇒ On 11 March 2025, the exhibition Belarusian Bestiary opened at the Mastactva Gallery in Minsk, dedicated to mythological characters of Belarusian folklore. The very next day, complaints began appearing on Telegram from pro-government activists, accusing the artists of hosting a “satanic sabbath” and “fighting against Christian values”. On 13 March, just two days after opening, the exhibition’s organisers, Jaŭhien and Jaŭhienija Kot, announced its early closure due to reasons beyond their control and began dismantling the display, originally scheduled to run through 22 March.
⇒ On 19 March, reports appeared that the traditional Svjata Sonca (Sun Celebration) festival, held at the Dudutki Museum to mark Kupała Night, would not occur this year. The permit for the event, scheduled for 21-22 June 2025, was revoked following criticism from pro-government activist Volha Bondarava, who called the festival a “neo-pagan sabbath with swastikas and runes”. Also the state news agency BELTA removed an article “Dive into the magic of the shortest night of the year. What will the VIII Svjata Sonca festival be like?” from its website. The Sun Celebration festival, featuring an open-air concert, fire show, craft fair, and traditional rituals, has been held in Belarus since 2016.
⇒ There were recorded instances of pressure on political prisoners, including their “re-training” from Belarusian to Russian, bans from speaking Belarusian during visits, and postal worker’s demanding that forms be filled out in Russian rather than Belarusian.
⇒ The unveiling of a Russian-language memorial plaque to Ivan Mielež in Chojniki (Homiel region), a People’s Writer of Belarus and author of the iconic Palessie Chronicle trilogy, is seen as an example of discrimination against the Belarusian language, which is crowded out from the public space. This decision contradicts Mielež’s literary legacy, reflects disrespect for his memory, and ignores his national and cultural identity.
⇒ Authorities continue restricting access to literature and other cultural or historical memory materials by labelling them “extremist materials”. These actions directly violate cultural rights. Since this was the most frequently recorded type of violation in the first quarter of 2025 (including the designation of cultural figures’ social media accounts as extremist), it will be addressed in more detail below.
CULTURE-RELATED MATERIALS LABELLED AS “EXTREMIST”
No fewer [4] than 115 culture-related materials or social media accounts of cultural figures were designated as “extremist” in the first quarter of 2025. Currently, in Belarus, merely subscribing to, sharing, liking, or forwarding any of these materials can result in up to 15 days of arrest or a fine of up to 1,260 Belarusian rubles. This list proves that the themes related to criticism of the Soviet past, coverage of repressions (including Stalin-era repressions), protest movements, national identity, and any forms of independent cultural expression and satire can be banned. Projects, books, and authors promoting Belarusian culture, language, and alternative views on history and the current political situation are persecuted. For example, between January and March 2025, the following publications were added to the National List of Extremist Materials.
Books and periodicals:
Vadzim Dzieružynski, Secrets of Belarusian History; Album BNR-100: Celebration of the 100th Anniversary in Belarus and Abroad; Marat Haravy, NKVD Killed in Kurapaty…; Dzmitry Daškievič, The Worm; Siarhiej Navumčyk, Ninety-Second and Ninety-Third; Viktar Chursik, Blood and Ashes of Drazhna: Stories of Partisan Crimes; Siarhiej Zacharevič, Partisans of the USSR: From Myths to Reality; Michaił Pinčuk, Soviet Partisans: Myths and Reality; Pavieł Šaramiet and Sviatłana Kalinkina, The Accidental President (Political Portrait); Magazine of the Belarusian Association of Journalists Abažur, Issue No. 3 (124).
Platforms, projects, products and communities of independent culture:
- Website and social media pages (Facebook, Telegram, Instagram) of the crowdfunding platform Gronka for supporting Belarusian cultural and educational projects.
- Telegram channel “Sacred Belavud”, a project by journalist and film critic Taras Tarnalicki about Belarusian cinema.
- YouTube channel “ShokingCult”, and the Telegram, Instagram, and Facebook accounts of cultural scholar and journalist Maksim Žbankoŭ.
- YouTube channel “Ministry of Sepulture”, and the Telegram and Instagram accounts of music critic Alaksandr Čarnucha.
- Website, YouTube channel, and Instagram page of stand-up comedian Słava Kamisarenka.
- Instagram account of Belarus Free Theatre.
- Instagram account of Free Belarus Museum.
- Telegram channel and logo of “Lichtar”, a new project of the independent Belarusian-language publication Novy Čas.
- YouTube channel and SoundCloud, VK, and Facebook accounts of the cultural platform “Art Siadziba” (in 2023, its founder Pavieł Biełavus was sentenced to 13 years in a penal colony for promoting Belarusian culture).
- Telegram channel of the Belarusian Institute of Public History.
- VK page of the historical and local history publication “VOLAT”, founded in Vilejka in 2004.
- Accounts on Odnoklassniki, VK, and Facebook of “Kabylaki. Executed in Orša”, an initiative researching Stalin-era repressions.
- YouTube channel “1142X” and the documentary film Forest by Maryja Bułavinskaja about Stalin-era repressions.
- VK page “Protest Cinema”.
- Facebook page “Teachers of Belarusian Language and Literature”.
- YouTube channel “NASHAMOVA”, Telegram and VK accounts of “MOVA POBAČ”, VK “Rodnaja Mova”.
- Instagram account “Belarusian Book | Žyvieteka | Warsaw”.
- Music tracks: “ILJIČ feat A. G. Łukašenka – Speed it Up!”, “A.S.A.V.” by Hands on the Blanket, “Žyvie Biełaruś (Long Live Belarus)” by Elysium.
- VK page “Anthology of Siberian Punk”.
- Instagram account Swadamusic (band Sw@da).
- Instagram account and logo by2020art.
- Instagram account of custom calendars “2025_calendar”.
- Telegram channel “Belarus Comic”.
- TikTok channel reformculture.
- And others.
Social media accounts of cultural figures
Telegram channel, Facebook page, and Twitter account of journalist and writer Dzmitry Hurnievič; Instagram account of actress and singer Alena Zuj-Vajciachoŭskaja; Twitter account of writer Alaksiej Minaŭ; Instagram account of producer and film director Volha Čajkoŭskaja; VK account of opera singer Marharyta Laŭčuk; Telegram channel of theatre director Mikałai Chalezin; Twitter account of comedian Michaś Iljin; Twitter account of American film director Ernie Barbarash; and other social media accounts of Belarusian (and non-Belarusian) cultural figures.
STATE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE
The overview of current topics and trends in state policy in the cultural sphere in the first quarter of 2025 examines cultural policy through the lens of the Telegram channel of the Ministry of Culture – the country’s leading cultural body. This mini study aimed to determine the extent to which official culture in Belarus is used as a tool for ideological service to the authorities.
Description of the study
The focus of content analysis was to study all posts published on the official Telegram channel of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Belarus (@minkultrb) from 1 January through 31 January 2025. This specific time frame was chosen due to the political context: the so-called presidential elections, where Alaksandr Łukašenka ran for a seventh term, took place in Belarus on 26 January 2025.
The units of measurement included the topic of the post, the language, the presence of hashtags, images, videos, and reposts, as well as quantitative parameters such as the number of views, reactions, and other features revealed during the analysis. Each post was treated as a separate unit, including system notifications about changes to the channel’s avatar (recorded on 17 January and 26 January). The analysis was conducted manually between 11 March and 10 April 2025. At the beginning of the study, the channel had 5,950 subscribers, and at the end – 6,118 subscribers.
The main findings of the analysis
In January 2025, 561 posts were published on the Ministry of Culture Telegram channel.
The busiest posting days were 22-24 January (44-53 posts per day), peaking on election day, 26 January, when 78 posts were published (14 % of all January posts).
The first post on election day was about transferring an 18th-century etching found at the Museum of the Great Patriotic War to the National Art Museum. The next 76 posts were dedicated to the elections. The final post was a system notification about reverting the channel’s avatar to its previous image after temporarily replacing it on 17 January with a logo linked to the elections (both posts are now unavailable).
The content of 26 January posts included coverage of Alaksandr Łukašenka’s voting process, his comments to state media, scenes from his visit to the polling station, reports on gifts for young voters, updates on voter turnout, testimonies about the voting motives and the choice made (always framed around support for the incumbent). Several posts covered the new Minister of Culture, Rusłan Čarniecki, and his family visiting a polling station. Most posts emphasised a “festive atmosphere” and a “spirit of patriotism” when describing concerts, exhibitions, film screenings, food buffets and decorations at polling stations. Some examples:
“On this day, polling stations turn into centres of cultural life, where an atmosphere of unity and joy reigns…”
“Creative teams and soloists from cultural institutions delight voters with performances, creating a pleasant atmosphere...”
“Exhibitions of visual and decorative arts and master classes are organised for voters…”
“A festive mood and spirit of patriotism prevail…”
“Polling stations offer buffets where voters can buy meat products, sausages, ready-to-eat food and pastries…”
“On the main Election Day in Viciebsk Region alone, about 600 trade and food service outlets operated, and around 1,200 cultural events were organised…”
The main talking points and political orientation of the content
The theme of the elections dominated the channel’s feed (31.2 % of all posts). The main talking points included the coverage of the main election day, early voting, meetings of Alaksandr Łukašenka’s trustees with the staff of state cultural institutions, the role of “independent” observers, and congratulations on Łukašenka’s re-election.
The second most frequently mentioned theme was the nationwide political and ideological campaign “Unity Marathon”. Partially organised by the Ministry of Culture, this campaign served as one of Łukašenka’s election campaign tools to strengthen state ideology and demonstrate support for the incumbent. Hanna Łukašenka, the daughter-in-law of Alaksandr Łukašenka, led the working group that organised this activity. Launched on 17 September 2024, the “Unity Marathon” covered 16 cities with hundreds of events, culminating in a gala concert “Time Chose Us” at Minsk Arena on 24 January.
The presidential election and the “Unity Marathon” accounted for 52.6 % of all January 2025 posts. The main hashtags were: #UnityMarathon, #CultureChooses, #CultureVotes, #Elections2025, #President.
Other ideologically coloured topics included the exhibition “My Belarus”, the propaganda film Alaksiej Tałaj’s Phoenix Bird, and events around the upcoming 80th Anniversary of Victory.
In contrast, culturally significant events were minimally represented. For example, the upcoming 100th anniversary of Janka Kupała’s “People’s Poet of Belarus” title was mentioned in only two posts (0.4 %). The city of Ivanava, the 2025 Cultural Capital of Belarus, also got only two mentions. Even allowing for January to be a “low season” for these topics, the pure cultural content (also related to society and religion) accounted for only around 20 % of the channel’s posts.
The channel’s language policy
Language-wise, Russian dominated the Telegram channel’s content. Out of a total of 551 text posts:
- 492 (89.3 %) were exclusively in Russian,
- 42 (7.6 %) were in Belarusian,
- 17 (3.1 %) used both languages.
Conclusion
In January 2025, the Telegram channel of the Ministry of Culture was actively used to support the presidential election and Alaksandr Łukašenka’s campaign (other candidates were not mentioned at all). Most of the content was election-oriented, covering propagandistic and ideological events. Culture outside politics was given only secondary attention, presented residually. Even in a sphere officially responsible for developing national culture, priority was given to content in Russian.
CONCLUSION
In the first quarter of 2025, repressions against cultural figures continued. Persecution, arrests, censorship, discrimination, and transnational pressure remain a daily reality for those who work with culture and words. Even the themes considered “safe” after the 2020 events – such as mythology and traditional culture – faced bans during the reporting period. Moreover, state cultural policy is often replaced by ideological service to the regime. This was especially evident during the January election campaign, when culture was only a tool for legitimising Łukašenka’s rule.
There has been an urgent need for international support for cultural figures under pressure inside Belarus and those in exile. This requires a coordinated effort from cultural and human rights organisations.
[1] According to Viasna Human Rights Centre
[2] The information about the number of cultural figures is not final, as not all cases become known immediately.
[3] The presidential election held in Belarus on 26 January 2025, took place under full control of the authorities, and its outcome was predetermined.
[4] Not all the materials can be identified as culture-related or belonging to cultural figures.